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Abstract 
Ethnic fractionalization is frequently used as an explanatory tool in models of economic 
development, civil war and public goods provision. However, if ethnic fractionalization is 
endogenous to political and economic change, its utility for further research diminishes. This 
turns out not to be the case. This paper provides the first comprehensive model of ethnic 
fractionalization as a dependent variable. It contributes new data on the founding date of the 
largest ethnic group in each state. It builds political and international variables into the 
analysis alongside historical and geoclimactic parameters. It extends previous work by testing 
models of politically-relevant ethnic fractionalization. In addition, this research interprets 
model results in light of competing theories of nationalism and political change. Results show 
that cross-national variation in ethnic fractionalization is largely exogenous to modern 
politico-economic change. However the data are inconclusive with respect to competing 
geoclimactic, historical institutional and modernist theories of ethnogenesis. 
 
Keywords: ethnic fractionalization, geoclimatic, theories of nationalism, ethnogenesis, 
dominant ethnicity, founding date 
 
Why are some countries more ethnically diverse than others? This is not a question that has 
received much attention in the social sciences. Many intuitively cite immigration as a critical 
factor, yet the foreign-born comprise under 3 percent of the world's population. Hence it is 
variation in native, or primary ethnic diversity (Francis 1976) that lies at the heart of the 
question. This paper breaks new ground by testing the relative weight played by geoclimatic 
variation, historical factors and politico-economic modernization in predicting interstate 
variation in ethnic fractionalization. In so doing, it offers a large-N evaluation of theories of 
nationalism. It introduces new data on historical institutional and international predictors of 
ethnic diversity. Finally, expanding beyond previous work on ethnic fractionalization, it 
employs linguistic, identity-based and politically-relevant ethnic heterogeneity measures. 
All contemporary issues of nationalism and ethnic conflict begin with the 'imperfect' 
overlap between ethnic/national communities and political units. Ethnic fractionalization 
indices provide a quantitative measure of one manifestation of this: the degree of ethnic 
pluralism contained under the political roof of each of the world's states. The ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index, or ELF, measures the likelihood that any two random individuals in a 
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state’s population are members of the same ethnic group.1 The greater the number of ethnic 
groups and the more even their relative size, the more fractionalized the population2.  
An ELF of 0 describes a very homogeneous state and 1 a highly diverse one. A more 
recent formulation attempts to modify the original 1964 ELF measure by considering the size 
of the largest and second largest ethnic groups to create a new metric, EF (Fearon and Laitin 
2003: 84). This has been mapped in figure 1.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
 
Critically, cultural diversity in the form of language, as measured by the Ethnologue 
dataset, for instance, must be distinguished from ethnic diversity, which is based on self-
identity measures. Ethnic identity in turn is not coterminous with politically-relevant 
ethnicity: in some societies, notably in sub-Saharan Africa, ethnicity has an 'onion'-like 
character, with several different levels, only the highest of which may be politically important 
(Posner 2005). Similarly, in North America, 'white' is now politically relevant in a way 
Croatian or German is not. Jewish and Mormon, however, remain politically relevant groups 
despite their size. In order to account for the imperfection of any single fractionalization 
measure, this paper utilizes a wide range of measures, seeking to evaluate which factors are 
most closely associated with different forms of ethnic fractionalization across the world's 
states. 
 Incumbent upon the pathbreaking work of Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. 
(1999) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), an extensive literature now exists on the relationship 
between ethnic fractionalization and political and economic outcomes such as economic 
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growth (Easterly et al. 2006), public goods provision (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007) and 
violent conflict. In terms of violent conflict, the literature is divided. Studies which take 
conflict onset as the independent variable tend to find no relationship with ethnic 
fractionalization (i.e. Sambanis 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2009). Those that focus on the incidence of civil war, by 
contrast, typically report a significant association (i.e. Ellingsen 2000; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2005; Urdal 2008). 
 Few have turned the question around to ask why some states are more fractionalized 
than others. Such questions are of more than intrinsic interest. They are also important 
because it is vital to understand the upstream determinants of the fractionalization which may 
be producing malign political and economic effects. Moreover, identifying fixed or slow-
changing correlates of ethnic fractionalization enables scholars to deploy these measures as 
bedrock independent or instrumental variables in their analyses. On the other hand, if ethnic 
fractionalization is at the mercy of faster-moving political and economic modernization 
factors, then it should properly be viewed as endogenous to modern economic and political 
change - and therefore less important. 
 
Theories of Nationalism and Ethnic Fractionalization 
 The three main theories of nationalism - primordialism, ethnosymbolism and 
modernism - offer competing explanations for the existence of ethnic diversity (Özkirimili 
2010). Primordialism locates ethnicity in universal aspects of human psychology. For 
primordialists, our evolutionary psychology represents the successful adaptation of humanity 
to conditions obtaining during prehistoric time. Primary among these is geography. 
Geoclimatic isolation of people produces cultural and genetic drift. Genetic distance creates 
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divergent genetic interests which are the basis for group boundaries and conflict. Phenotype 
is used where available as an indicator of genetic difference but because neighbouring groups 
rarely look different, culture is activated as a marker of genetic boundaries when groups leave 
their ecologies and come into contact with others (Van den Berghe 2002; Pinker 2011: 353-
55).  
In effect, ethnic boundaries based on genetic and cultural difference preserve the 
variations incubated in ecological niches. In this manner, geoclimatic explanations for 
variations in ethnic fractionalization are most closely related to primordialism. An alternative 
'geoculturalist' interpretation would claim that geography shapes ethnogenesis via cultural 
diversity and its usefulness as a group marker, but that this diversity is subsequently 
amenable to being eroded and reshaped by social processes (Cavalli-Sforza 2001). This 
second formulation would predict that while traces of geography's effects may remain in 
ethnic fractionalization patterns, the two will be more loosely connected than if primordialist 
assumptions hold. 
 Critics of primordialism suggest that kin-selection impulses are deflected toward 
constructed forms of community like teams, religious groups or political nations (Brigandt 
2001). They also reject the primordialist position that ethnicity can exist in small groups, 
averring that by definition, ethnic communities must involve a larger scale of human 
community. Bonds therefore need to be culturally imagined rather than merely experienced in 
the form of face-to-face gemeinschaft relationships (Anderson 1983). The ethnosymbolist 
school, for example, concurs with primordialists that ethnic groups predate the modern era, 
but emphasizes the importance of political and cultural institutions rather than geography. 
Ethnosymbolists claim that ethnic groups do not arise until the late neolithic period when 
writing, religion, recorded history and extra-local mobilization allowed for the formation of 
communities knit together by ‘imagined’ bonds of territory, memory and ancestry (Smith 
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1986: 44-5). Often ethnic consciousness remained the preserve of a small elite, as with the 
Anglo-Saxon English consciousness of the Venerable Bede and King Alfred (Hastings 1997: 
35-9). Some ethnic groups (i.e. Jews, Amhara, Armenians, Persians) had ancient origins, 
while many more emerged in the medieval and early modern periods through tribal 
confederation (i.e. Arabs, Kurds), conquest agglomeration (i.e. Gothic founders of Spain) or 
dynastic competition (i.e. Scots, Catalans). In all cases, territorial identities extending beyond 
the locale came to be established (Smith 1986; Armstrong 1982). 
There are two major forms of ethnicity, according to Francis' (1976: 6) schema: 
primary ethnicity, in which members of the group occupy their ancestral ‘homeland’ 
territory; and secondary ethnicity, whereby groups acknowledge that they are diaspora and 
not native, and thus their homeland lies elsewhere. Since immigrants form just 2.7 percent of 
the world's population, it is primary ethnic fractionalization which is generally captured by 
ELF and is by far the most important form of fractionalization when it comes to economic 
development and conflict (Demeny and McNicoll 2006, ch.1). Most of the premodern entities 
studied by ethnosymbolists are primary ethnic groups, even if they sometimes spawn 
secondary offshoots like the Jewish, Parsee and Armenian diasporas.  
The appearance of translations of religious texts such as the bible into vernacular 
languages, and the numerous recorded premodern references to natio, gens and ethnos is 
cited in favour of the theory (Hastings 1997). This explains why historians of the medieval 
period tend to be ethnosymbolists (Zimmer and Scales 2005). This argument predicts that 
ethnic identities, once formed, are highly path-dependent and durable. Ethnic sentiments are 
reproduced by both state and vernacular institutions. The vernacular rootedness of ethnicity 
means that it is capable of inspiring collective action and resisting ‘official’ political and 
identity constructs imposed by the state. Though more culturalist than materialist in 
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orientation, ethnosymbolist theory nests most comfortably within historical institutionalism, 
evincing greater skepticism of explanations tied to geoclimatic or modernizing factors. 
The modernist account contests the ethnosymbolist and primordialist version of 
events. It argues that premodern identities were strictly local – for the peasant masses, or 
imperial-religious for military and religious elites (Anderson [1983] 1991; Gellner 1983; 
Giddens [1985] 1996). Modernity fractures the horizontal ties between cosmopolitan elites, 
as with Latin Christendom, which fragmented into nation-states with their own vernacular 
languages. Beneath them, locals were ‘invited into history’, and came to be connected to 
wider, self-conscious territorial communities (Nairn 1977). Print capitalism, mass 
conscription, mass education, secularization and more intensive transport networks combine 
to orient local identities toward a common, this-worldly community. Pre-existing cultures are 
orthogonal to this process, which is driven by political and economic imperatives. 
'Nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, 
sometimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality,' writes 
Eric Hobsbawm (1990: 10).  
Beyond the majority ethnic identity - created by the new nation-state - shared ethnic 
identities are forged in modern times through states' internal administrative boundary 
marking activity. This reflexive demarcation institutionalizes ethnic diversity, as with Soviet 
Republics or colonial administrative departments. Divide-and-rule policies by imperial rulers 
and missionaries contribute to the process (Trevor-Roper 1983; Brass 1991; Brubaker 1996; 
Wimmer 2002).  Anti-state mobilization by political entrepreneurs, often driven by the 
imperative to control important industrial resources such as oil, is another vector of 
ethnogenesis. Ethnic entrepeneurs may have experienced blocked upward mobility within 
central state structures (Gellner 1983), or may use ethnic and national movements as a 
vehicle to acquire more power or wealth than they might through conventional political 
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channels (Breuilly 1993). Modern processes, not geography and premodern history, are 
responsible for spawning ethnic diversity. 
 
Existing Work on the Genesis of Ethnic Fractionalization 
 Work on ethnic diversity as a dependent variable is in its early stages. The best 
developed line of inquiry concerns geoclimatic predictors. Thomas Sowell remarks that sub-
Saharan Africa's lack of navigable rivers, smooth shallow coasts and mesa-like terrain has 
left a legacy of exceptional linguistic diversity (Sowell 2011: 317-18). Others find that the 
wider the diversity in land quality and topography in a territory, the greater the ethnic 
fractionalization (Michalopoulos 2012; Sutherland 2003). Ahlerup and Olsson (2011) add 
that an early incidence of initial prehistoric human settlement, together with geoclimatic 
factors, predicts enhanced diversity. States far from mankind's East African origins, such as 
Sweden, were settled later than equatorial regions, and hence possess less ethnic diversity. 
Laitin and Robinson (2011) also advance a geoclimatic argument, applying Jared Diamond's 
continental axis theory to individual states. They uncover some evidence that linguistic 
diversity is greater in states characterized by a North-South cartographic skew as compared 
with those which spread in a more East-West direction.  
 Historical institutional factors feature in work with the State Antiquity dataset 
(Bockstette et al. 2002). This uncovers a significant negative association between ELF and 
the date of initial state formation coupled with the degree of indigenous control of the state in 
the ensuing period. The logic is that older states, and those where the indigenous population 
had greater political control, could spread their culture and identity and are therefore less 
diverse than newer states - or those ruled by foreigners. However the connection between 
state history and ethnic fractionalization is a bivariate finding since this relationship was not 
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the primary focus of the authors. Fletcher and Iyigun (2009) claim a higher incidence of 
Muslim-Christian conflict between 1400 and 1900 predicts lower ethnic fractionalization in 
today's European and Middle Eastern states while those which experienced Protestant-
Catholic conflict or anti-Jewish pogroms are more fractionalized. Nunn (2008: 164), also 
working from a historical institutional perspective, considers the role of four historic slave 
trades in producing ethnolinguistic diversity in Africa. The internal tribe-on-tribe raiding that 
characterized African slave economies is linked to weaker precolonial states and, by 
extension, more ethnic fractionalization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 87).  
 Modernist approaches to this subject are in their infancy. Green (2013), using Philip 
Roeder's 1961 and 1985 datasets (Roeder 2001), contends that urbanization in postcolonial 
states in Africa during 1961-85 is associated with declining levels of ethnic diversity. This 
echoes qualitative work which notes the presence of ethnic fusion in modernizing locations 
such as the colonial Zambian Copperbelt settlements of the 1930s where miners from 
formerly distinct groups amalgamated into larger ethnic entities based on cultural relatedness 
(Eriksen 1993: 20-21). This paper breaks new ground by adopting a comprehensive approach 
that incorporates geoclimatic diversity, historical indicators, modernization and international 
determinants. Finally, expanding beyond previous work, it encompasses linguistic, identity-
based and politically-relevant ethnic fractionalization measures. 
 
Geoclimatic Variation and Ethnic Fractionalization 
The three major theories of nationalism make different predictions regarding the 
relationship between geography and ethnic fractionalization. Primordialists would view 
extreme ecological diversity - as in the New Guinea case - as diversity-enhancing. Yet for 
ethnosymbolism, extreme isolation produces sub-ethnic localism, impeding imagined 
community. This localism produces disorganization, reducing resistance to the modern state 
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when it eventually penetrates the periphery, and renders the task of nation-building easier 
than might be the case in a situation where larger ethnic groups have mobilized. However, 
above a certain threshold - perhaps several thousand in population  - an ethnosymbolist would 
grant that difficult terrain acts to increase the number of competing premodern polities. Rival 
ethnic identities can take root so long as there are literate intellectuals and institutions that 
help spread myths, symbols and memories beyond the local. Terrain that permits this 
mobilization while preventing wider integration is optimal in producing ethnic fragmentation. 
Thus more challenging terrain would be expected to lead to greater ethnic heterogeneity, but 
less so than in the primordialist case.  
For modernists, varied terrain acts as a barrier to the state in its quest to homogenize 
populations and facilitates secessionists' strategy of escaping to peripheral redoubts from 
which they can construct their interest-reinforcing ethnic projects. For Horowitz, ethnic 
fusion tends to occur with political amalgamation; fission with political division (Horowitz 
1975: 139-40). Meanwhile, variegated terrain hampers the networks of coordination (Laitin 
2007) which incentivize participants to join an imagined community. Though ecological 
variation is associated with greater ethnic fractionalization in all three theories, this 
relationship would be expected to be stronger under assumptions of primordialism than for 
competing theories. We can test for this by examining the relationship between a country’s 
geoclimatic diversity and its ethnic diversity.  
 
Thus our first hypothesis: 
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H1: Geoclimatic variation is associated with ethnic fractionalization. The stronger the 
relationship, the greater the support for primordialist theories 
 
Historical Institutions and Ethnic Fractionalization 
 According to ethnosymbolist theory, modern nations typically form around 
premodern dominant ethnic groups (Smith 1986). In most cases, the dominant ethnic group is 
also largest because popular sovereignty and democratization spread their influence down the 
social scale and render exclusive dominant minorities like Syria's Alawis rare (Kaufmann and 
Haklai 2008). Therefore we may approach the question of ethnic absorption through 
measures of ethnic and state antiquity. The State Antiquity dataset asks when a polity above 
the tribal level was founded on the territory of an existing state; whether this was 
indigenously-controlled or foreign; and further, what proportion of the territory of the 
present-day state was under native rule. This is determined for every 50-year period since 1 
A.D. Different rates of discounting past periods are applied by the authors, with the most 
common measure being a 5 percent discount every 50 years (Putterman 2007). 
 An alternative approach is to attempt to code the founding date of the largest ethnic 
group in a state. This serves as a measure of ethnic absorption because older dominant ethnic 
groups will have had more time in which to assimilate neighbouring or subaltern groups than 
newer groups. Dominant ethnic groups frequently emerge as assimilationist actors - 
fractionalization-reducing nuclei - within multi-ethnic states. Connor (1994a: 96) notes that 
homogeneous nation-states occur in less than 10 percent of the world, but that a substantial 
majority of states contain an ethnic majority. All but five of 156 countries in Vanhanen's 
(1999) dataset feature a plurality group of a third or more of the population. In other words, 
some form of ethnic dominance appears to be nearly universal (Kaufmann 2004).  
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 Modernists would be somewhat more circumspect. They would explain ethnic 
homogeneity as a result of nation-building and the ethnic exclusions practiced by modern 
states (Wimmer 2002). States established earlier in the modern period would be expected to 
contain less ethnic diversity than more recent states, but the age of premodern ethnic groups 
should bear no relation to contemporary fractionalization after controlling for the age of the 
modern state.  
 How to measure the founding date of the largest ethnic group? This is nowhere near 
as straightforward as the founding date of states. In this paper, ethnic founding dates are 
operationalized as the first imagining of the group by a putative member of the group. The 
Ethnic Plurality Group Founding Dates dataset has been developed through a survey of 
historians and social scientists with expertise on particular countries. Accepting the 'reality' of 
these ethnic founding dates does not entail embracing the ethnosymbolist perspective. 
Premodern ethnic imaginings are explained by modernists as the musings of individuals - 
with no consequences for mass social and political behaviour. Primordialists, too, would 
consider these visions to be subsidiary to spontaneous collective nepotism in the process of 
ethnic fusion.  
 
Therefore, an ethnosymbolist would expect that: 
 
H2: States with a plurality ethnic group that is comparatively old will have lower degrees of 
ethnic fractionalization; and 
H3: States that have an older tradition of indigenous control will have lower degrees of ethnic 
fractionalization 
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Modernists would qualify this as follows: 
 
H4: Older modern states (defined as post-1789 phenomena) will have lower degrees of ethnic 
fractionalization, but pre-1789 ethnic plurality founding dates or state antiquity scores should 
not affect ethnic fractionalization net of the age of the modern state 
 
Primordialism grounds its claims in the ethnic substratum. It is skeptical of states' ability to 
fuse ethnic groups together, even in the long run. It treats ethnicity as being of prehistoric 
provenance. Therefore neither ethnic nor state age should affect fractionalization measures. 
 Modernists locate the source of ethnic fragmentation in modern political and 
economic factors. States with an abundance of exportable primary commodities such as oil 
are more likely to experience rent-seeking and ethnic entrepreneurialism and consequently 
will be more ethnically fractionalized than others. States experiencing political instability in 
the form of a transition between autocratic and democratic governance are more likely to 
offer opportunities to political entrepreneurs. Democracy, however, once attained, should 
permit dissent to be expressed through the state rather than via extra-statal insurgent 
movements, lowering fractionalization. Finally, urbanization and income per capita are 
indicators of the intensity of modernity in a state. Thus modernists would predict that: 
 
H5: States with higher levels of urbanization, democracy and income per capita should be less 
ethnically fractionalized; and 
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H6: States whose economy is based on exportable primary commodities and/or those 
undergoing political instability should be more ethnically fractionalized 
 
Data 
Dependent Variables  
The dependent variable consists of seven distinct measures of ethnic fractionalization. These 
cover a range, from those which tap cultural diversity (but which may not be salient for 
identity) to those which measure politically-salient constructs (which may consist of supra-
ethnic amalgams). NUMBRLANG, the number of languages in a country as derived from 
Ethnologue (Michalopoulos 2012), or ELF, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index as 
derived from the 1964 Soviet ethnographic atlas, lie on the cultural side of the spectrum. 
ELFPREG lies at the political end, and measures a country's politically-relevant ethnic 
fractionalization index. Homogeneous countries deemed not to have politicized ethnic 
divisions are excluded from the analysis. MAXPOP is the share of the state's population 
made up the largest politically-relevant ethnic group (Wimmer et. al. 2009). In between the 
culturalist and political measures lie those that focus more squarely o  ethnic identity: 
PLURAL (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and PCTMAJ (Vanhanen 1999) are measures of the share 
of the population made up of the largest ethnic group. EF, the fractionalization measure used 
by Fearon and Laitin (2003), combines information on the size of the largest and second 
largest ethnic groups, with data on the total number of linguistic groups exceeding 1 percent 
of the population.   
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Independent Variables 
A full list of variables used in the analysis, with data sources and frequencies, appears in 
appendices 1 and 2.3 Geoclimatic data covers mean temperature, mean elevation, mean 
precipitation, distance to the sea, standard deviation of mean elevation, mean agricultural 
suitability and standard deviation of mean agricultural suitability. Historical institutional 
variables include state antiquity, origin date of largest ethnic group, date of transition to 
agriculture, log of population density in 1500, and historic slave exports per capita.4 Data on 
the founding date of the largest ethnic group in each state has been collected through our 
British Academy-funded survey of experts, supplemented with textual sources. Methodology, 
questionnaire and detailed response data for the Ethnic Plurality Group Founding Dates 
dataset may be found at: www.sneps.net/ethnic/ethnicdates.htm.  
 Modernization variables encompass state founding date, political instability, 
proportion urbanized, democracy (Polity IV) score, GDP per capita, oil output per capita, 
commodity exports per capita and infant mortality rate. In addition there are a series of 
parameters which do not easily fit one of the major theories. These include population 
density, which could stem from geoclimatic, historical or modern influences, land area, a 
dummy variable for ex-colonies, wave of state formation, world region and number of 
historic secessions. We also code for states which emerged from successful ethnic national 
self-determination movements as well as states with longstanding or current dominant 
minorities (see Appendix 3)5, refining the data through discussion with Anthony Smith, a 
leading expert on the history and sociology of ethnonationalist movements.  
 
Results 
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Results are shown in table 1. We are restricted to cross-sectional models due to the absence 
of time-series data on ethnic fractionalization. Many independent variables are also 
unavailable over time. Most datasets ignore smaller island states, reducing the universe of 
cases. Finally, gaps in the data result in a small degree of listwise deletion. The number of 
cases (112 to 136 depending on the specification) limits our degrees of freedom, thus the 
need for a iterative approach beginning with strictly geoclimatic, historical and modernist 
specifications to reduce the number of parameters before bringing the most promising 
variables together into a combined Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis using Stata 7.0.6  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 This yields the results in table 1.  This model predicts over 60 percent of the variation 
in the four identity-based ethnic fractionalization measures. It performs less well when the 
dependent variable is pure linguistic diversity or politically-relevant ethnic fractionalization, 
but still captures half or more of the variation. Of geoclimatic predictors, higher and drier 
countries contain less diversity. Those with greater variation in elevation and soil 
productivity are more fractionalized. As the dependent variable moves from language to 
identity to politically-organized groups, the power of geoclimatic parameters weakens. In our 
two models of politically-relevant ethnic fractionalization (ELFPREG and MAXPOP), no 
geoclimatic predictors remain significant.  
 One should not overplay the importance of this finding. Of non-geographic predictors, 
only oil output per capita and the sub-Saharan Africa dummy are significantly associated 
with politically-relevant ethnic fractionalization. Moreover, variation in elevation and soil 
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type approach significance and relationships are signed in the expected direction in these 
models. One must bear in mind, however, that homogeneous countries are deemed not 
'relevant' in ethnic terms on the PREG measure: the 22 states excluded in this way tend to be 
highly homogeneous, such as Denmark, or, in a few instances such as Tanzania, extremely 
heterogeneous. Since the average excluded state has an 81 percent ethnic majority as against 
67 percent for included states, this weakens the predictive power of parameters which 
distinguish highly homogeneous states from moderately diverse ones. Furthermore, 
politically-relevant ethnic group measures represent an aggregation of ethnic groups into 
politically-relevant entities on the national stage which in some cases may be considered pan-
ethnic rather than ethnic. Thus it taps processes of supra-ethnic amalgamation as well as 
ethnic diversity. 
 The combined model delivers a verdict on H2 ,H3 and H4. First of all, while the 
antiquity of civilization and indigenous control is correlated with ELF and EF, table 1 shows 
that this bivariate relationship washes out with the addition of other parameters to the model, 
disconfirming H3. H2, concerning plurality ethnic group antiquity, cannot be dismissed as 
summarily. While the significance of plurality ethnic group founding date for 
fractionalization disappears in multivariate analysis, it exhibits nonlinearity which can best be 
captured by a variable for states whose largest ethnic group was founded between 0 and 1100 
A.D.7 The most likely explanation for this pattern is that the period from 0-1100 A.D. was 
one in which some of the earliest continuous 'ethnic states' (Smith 1986), with elite myths of 
descent and cultural codes, were formed. It encompasses many states which occupy lands 
captured during the Sunni Arab conquests of the 7th-11th centuries. In addition, a number of 
durable East Asian kingdoms arose at this time and many West European states emerged out 
of the Germanic barbarian successor dynasties which replaced the western Roman Empire 
(see figure 2).  
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[Figure 2 here] 
 
This raises the question posed by H4, namely, is the founding date of the largest ethnic group 
or that of the state more central in predicting the four identity-based fractionalization 
measures (ELF, EF, PLURALITY, PCTMAJ)? The two are close, but state date proved a 
somewhat more powerful predictor than ethnic date in two of three models, confirming H4.  
 Confirming, but with caveats: one reason to be skeptical of the superiority of the 
modernist explanation based on state founding date rather than the ethnosymbolist (ethnic) 
date measure is that reverse causation is a stronger possibility for state founding date. 
Namely, it is highly plausible that a more ethnically fractionalized territory might hinder the 
formation of a modern state. By contrast, fractionalization prior to state formation is unlikely 
to affect the founding date of the ethnic group that emerges as the largest in the state. 
 Modernist theory is more unambiguously supported by the predictive power of oil 
output per capita, lending support to H6. This is a significant parameter in four of seven 
models, backing 'greed'- based modernist arguments based on ethnic entrepreneurialism 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1994). Structural modernization variables offer a mixed picture: 
democracy enters just one of seven models and GDP per capita none. Infant mortality rate 
(not shown) did not approach significance in any specifications. We therefore find little 
support for H5. 
 Modern political and economic dynamics count for more when it comes to reducing 
ethnic fractionalization over time. The founding date of the state is significant in several 
specifications, suggesting that national integration is an important solvent of ethnic bonds. It 
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is also vital to appreciate that this is an analysis of variation between countries rather than 
time points. The static nature of the dependent variable biases the data against faster-moving 
predictors, hence these results do not negate the importance of modernizing processes in 
reducing diversity in time. Predictors of variation between countries at one point in time are 
often different from those which predict variation within countries over time (Kittel 2001: 
233).  
 As noted, there is qualified support here for historical institutionalist arguments. The 
sub-Saharan Africa dummy, the only variable to perform well across all models, partitions 
fairly evenly into effects related to the volume of historic slave exports per capita and 
regional effects unrelated to the legacy of slavery.8 Along with ethnic group founding date 
effects, this thereby lends some credence to ethnosymbolic approaches. All told, the results 
are inconclusive in arbitrating between ethnosymbolism and modernism, though both 
underperform primordialism in the sense that geoclimatic variables are more powerfully 
associated with all but the politically-relevant measures of ethnic fractionalization. 
 Other variables, not readily assignable to the three major theories of nationalism, 
figure prominently in the combined model. Population density in 1995, which springs from 
geoclimatic, historical institutional and modernist sources, is significant in five of seven 
specifications, though its sign changes when the dependent variable moves from linguistic to 
identity-based measures of fractionalization. In general, denser populations are associated 
with less ethnic fractionalization. This effect persists with a control for population density in 
1500 indicating that more recent variation in population growth may underpin this 
correlation.9 Larger territories are expected to contain more groups, and this is borne out in 
the data: land area is significant in three models and signed in the expected direction in all 
seven. 
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 Among other variables unrelated to major theories of nationalism, neither a state's 
number of historic secessions nor its rule by a historic dominant minority were associated 
with ethnic fractionalization. This may be because more fractionalized states such as 
Russia/USSR and Serbia/Yugoslavia are more apt to experience secession such that the two 
effects negate each other. Finally, the historic era in which states were created is important. 
Those which formed prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 are most homogeneous, while 
those emerging during the period of decolonization are most diverse. Importantly however, a 
term capturing whether a country is an ex-European colony did not reach significance in the 
model in table 1, though it was important in several more restricted specifications.10 This 
questions the general wisdom that colonization, by running roughshod over ethnic 
boundaries, is primarily responsible for sub-Saharan Africa's high ethnic fractionalization. It 
seems the ethnically fractionalizing inheritance of slavery plays a more important role in this 
development, as Nunn (2008) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) surmise.  
 Finally, states which emerged on the back of nationalist movements defined in ethnic 
terms (see appendix 3) are somewhat more homogeneous: ethnic nationalism reaches 
significance in two of seven models, though it is signed in the expected direction in all. This 
intimates that successful ethnic nationalists partially attain their homogeneous utopias. Their 
failure to fully realize their dreams probably stems from the fact that most, i.e. Lebanese 
Christians, Romanians or Ulster Protestants in the interwar period, bear few qualms about 
annexing territory populated by other groups (Brubaker 1996).  
 
Discussion 
Why are some countries more ethnically diverse than others? This paper weighs explanations 
based on geoclimatic, historical and politico-economic factors and concludes that geoclimatic 
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diversity is the most important predictor of international differences in ethnic 
fractionalization. States with a greater difference between their highest and lowest points are 
significantly more diverse than others. The same holds for those with a wider range of soil 
types. Higher and drier countries are more homogeneous than low, wet ones. Overall, 
geoclimatic variables are more strongly associated with ethnic fractionalization than 
premodern historical or modern politico-economic predictors. This speaks to the importance 
of interpretations which hold that ecological diversity lays the basis for linguistic and ethnic 
diversity, as exemplified by the case of Papua New Guinea.  
 This primordialist thesis must be qualified, however, by noting that geoclimatic 
variables are not strongly associated with politically-relevant ethnic diversity. This is an 
important corrective to the existing literature on geographic determinants. Ethnosymbolic 
legacies from the premodern period also have an important bearing on ethnic 
fractionalization, though less so than geography. Ethnic group founding date is a weak 
(inverse) predictor of ethnic diversity, probably because older groups have had longer to 
assimilate proximal neighbours. Moreover, their patina of age confers prestige. This variable 
is not linear, however: plurality ethnic groups formed in the period between 0 and 1100 A.D. 
are associated with highly homogeneous states while ancient plurality groups and those 
formed after 1100 are located in more diverse ones. In terms of historical factors, this study 
corroborates the claims of Nunn (2008) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that African 
states with a history of slave exports are more fractionalized than other countries. There is 
modest evidence that a late transition to agriculture is associated with greater ethnic 
fractionalization. 
 Most modern economic and political variables are not associated with ethnic 
fractionalization. Cross-national differences in urbanization, health and income had little or 
no predictive power. Of all modernization variables, only the founding date of the modern 
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state proved robustly associated with ethnic fractionalization. Modernist explanations, based 
on the competition for lootable resources driving ethnogenesis, receive more support from 
this study. Oil exports per capita are strongly associated with ethnic fractionalization, and one 
of the few consistently significant predictors of politically-relevant ethnic diversity. Per 
capita commodity exports is significantly associated with some fractionalization measures in 
a few models. On the other hand, political instability fails to predict diversity in any model. 
 'Every 14 days a language dies,' claims the National Geographic's Enduring Voices 
Project team. 'By 2100, more than half of the more than 7,000 languages spoken on Earth—
many of them not yet recorded—may disappear.'11 Qualitative evidence that modernization is 
driving this decline, or, in a similarly intuitive vein, that secession reduced ethnic 
fractionalization in Russia/USSR after 1989, can only be uncovered using time-series data. 
The global coverage of the large-scale Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), while 
imperfect, will eventually furnish a global database to conduct time-series ethnic 
fractionalization research. Meanwhile innovative historical approaches, such as those 
utilizing sub-state census data for one or more countries (Urdal 2008) or providing 
fractionalization data at two time points (Roeder 2011; Green 2013) offer new pathways 
toward understanding the temporal aspects of this phenomenon. 
 There is a less theoretically-classifiable input into fractionalization from international 
factors. Ethnic diversity tends to decrease when state and ethnic boundaries converge, and 
vice-versa. This can occur as a) the number of political units increases and/or b) ethnicity and 
politics come into closer alignment through secession and partition. States which experienced 
secessions are no more homogeneous than others in the data and those with historic dominant 
minorities are not more fractionalized. However, the data shows that states formed through 
ethnically-defined national self-determination movements are more homogeneous than more 
'civic' states originating on the basis of ideology or Great Power machinations. 
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 Finally, the historic era in which states were created is important. Those which 
formed prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 are most homogeneous, while those 
emerging during the period of decolonization are most diverse. Having said this, ex-colonies 
are not significantly more fractionalized than other countries once geographic, historical 
institutional and modernist factors are introduced into the model. This questions the 
conventional wisdom that colonial borders condemned African states to ethnic 
fractionalization. Instead, these results suggest that variegated and low-lying terrain, a history 
of slavery and the presence of lootable resources better explains the ethnic diversity of sub-
Saharan Africa. Indirect effects of colonization, such as the large size and recent vintage of 
Africa's states, are contributing factors. 
 These results question the strong variant of constructionist theory which claims that 
ethnolinguistic diversity may be created ex nihilo. This suggests that ethnic entrepreneurs can 
politicize pre-existing linguistic divisions or activate previously latent ethnic identities, but 
will have difficulty creating language and ethnicity anew. The Ijaw movement in Nigeria in 
the late 1990s, for example, represents the emergence of a new politically-relevant ethnic 
group in response to the glaring inequalities and pollution generated by local oil resources 
(Osaghae 2008). However, the Ijaw have been constructed on the basis of subgroups which 
the Ethnologue dataset classifies as speaking a related language. Linguistic invention for 
political reasons is not impossible: Bosnian, Croat and Serb variants of Serbo-Croat have 
only recently been developed. Yet the principal source of ethnolinguistic difference is 
geographical and historical. Ethnogenesis requires a plausibility structure and degree of 
popular resonance which limits the scope for invention (Zimmer 2003: 174). Hence nakedly 
political attempts at ethnogenesis such as the Padanian movement in Northern Italy, the 
Cruithin interpretation of Ulster Protestant origins or the Arab myth among Trinidadian 
Muslim Indians have proven conspicuous failures (Kaufmann 2008).  
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  On the whole, the most striking finding of this paper is that cross-national differences 
in ethnic fractionalization are largely rooted in the geography, climate and historical 
institutions of a country. Ethnic diversity broadly predates modern political and economic 
change, and is therefore a useful independent parameter for analyzing contemporary political 
and economic life. 
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Notes 
                                                            
1 Ethnic group as used here encompasses both ethnic categories and groups. For the distinction, see Eriksen 
1993, p. 44. 
2 Initial research on ELF used data from a 1960s Soviet ethnographic atlas (Bruk, S. I. and V. S.  Apenchenko, 
eds.  1964.  Atlas narodov mira.  Moscow: Glavnoe upravlenie geodezii i kartografii gosudarstvennogo 
geologicheskogo komiteta SSSR and Institut etnografii im. H. H. Miklukho-Maklaia, Akademiia nauk SSSR.) 
3 All appendices at: www.sneps.net/ethnic/append.htm. 
4 Exports encompasses a total for all four African slave trades - trans-Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, 
and trans-Saharan. For more, see Nunn (2008). 
5 All appendices at: www.sneps.net/ethnic/append.htm. 
6 These partial models can be viewed at: www.sneps.net/ethnic/alternative.htm. 
7 Logged variants of plurality ethnic group founding date also improve performance, but not as dramatically. 
See www.sneps.net/ethnic/alternative.htm for alternative specification with ethnic group founding date instead 
of 0-1100 A.D. origin. 
8 Rerunning the four identity-based models (EF, ELF, PLURAL, PCTMAJ) with an interaction term for sub-
Saharan African slave exports results in the sub-Saharan Africa dummy and sub-Saharan African slave exports 
each falling out of two models. Both remain signed in the expected direction across all models. Sub-Saharan 
African slave exports was not included in the combined model due to restricted degrees of freedom, but this 
specification is shown in table 5 in www.sneps.net/ethnic/alternative.htm. 
9 See table 2 in www.sneps.net/ethnic/alternative.htm. 
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10 See table 4 in www.sneps.net/ethnic/alternative.htm. 
11 See the National Geographic's Enduring Voices project website at: 
http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/enduring-voices/. 
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Figure 1. Global Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EF), 1999  
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Table 1. Combined Model of Ethnic Fractionalization 
 NMBRLANG ELF EF ELFPREG PLURALITY PCTMAJ MAXPOP 
State  0.002 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 -0.001* -0.046 0.000 
Found. Date (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) 
Land Area 0.555*** 0.038** 0.017 0.038* -0.014 -1.054 -0.024 
(Square km) (0.070) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.912) (0.015) 
Democracy  -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.148** 0.000 
(Polity IV) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.049) (0.001) 
GDP per -0.047 0.006 -0.017 -0.016 0.026 0.893 0.026 
capita (0.156) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) (2.046) (0.030) 
Oil Output 0.009 -0.001 0.009** 0.015** -0.009** -0.184 -0.015*** 
Per Capita (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.215) (0.004) 
Ethnic Origin -0.287 -0.141** -0.126** -0.077 0.085* 12.921** 0.030 
0-1100 A.D. (0.288) (0.049) (0.047) (0.068) (0.043) (3.772) (0.062) 
Mean 0.008*** 0.001 0.001* 0.000 -0.001** -0.061** 0.000 
Precipitation (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) 
S.d. of Mean 2.043 0.518* 0.582** 0.506 -0.507** -41.721* -0.344 
Agric. Suitability (1.214) (0.206) (0.198) (0.257) (0.182) (15.928) (0.232) 
S.d. of Mean 1.208* 0.171* 0.190* 0.048 -0.186* -9.561 -0.127 
Elevation (0.491) (0.083) (0.080) (0.102) (0.074) (6.437) (0.093) 
Mean -0.751* -0.105 -0.116* 0.003 0.114* 7.097 0.019 
Elevation (0.325) (0.055) (0.053) (0.068) (0.049) (4.267) (0.062) 
Sub-Saharan 0.695* 0.239*** 0.222*** 0.242** -0.234*** -12.801** -0.315*** 
Africa (0.315) (0.054) (0.052) (0.068) (0.047) (4.134) (0.061) 
Ethnic -0.134 -0.091 -0.110* -0.100 0.076 7.960* 0.031 
Nationalism (0.276) (0.047) (0.045) (0.061) (0.041) (3.626) (0.056) 
Population  0.063* -0.267** -0.587** -0.223 0.486* 51.546** 0.182 
Density (1995) (1.235) (0.210) (0.202) (0.253) (0.185) (16.204) (0.230) 
constant -1.384 -2.428** -1.439 -1.052 1.858** 144.659* 1.067 
 (4.546) (0.772) (0.743) (0.980) (0.681) (59.625) (0.893) 
        
N 136 136 136 112 136 136 113 
R
2
 0.565 0.636 0.618 0.497 0.621 0.617 0.537 
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable at top of 
each column. NMBRLANG, ELF, EF and ELFPREG are measures of ethnic fractionalization, PLURAL, PCTMAJ and 
MAXPOP of the size of the largest ethnic group. See Appendix 1 for further details. 
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Figure 2. Plurality Ethnic Group Founding Dates and Ethnic Fractionalization  
167x104mm (72 x 72 DPI)  
 
 
Page 29 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
